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LOUISIANA TRUSTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF A CIVIL
LAW JURISDICTION WITH THE TRUST
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio*
If in the field of trusts, Louisiana capitulated to the common law,
it was an honorable surrender.'
Incorporating a common law concept into a jurisdiction of the civil
law tradition presents many difficulties, not only in terminology, but
in basic underlying legal concepts. Not only do answers to questions
vary in the two traditions, but the questions themselves are entirely
different in many instances Such was the dilemma faced by Loui-
siana, a civil law island in a sea of common law jurisdictions, as it
debated the acceptance of the trust concept. The trust was a flexible
economic and social institution that had proven its usefulness in the
surrounding states and offered participants various functional and tax
advantages. Yet, coordinating a common law concept into the Loui-
siana mold was no easy task.
OBSTACLES TO THE TRUST
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the adoption of the trust by any
jurisdiction with a civilian legal tradition is the duality of ownership
inherent in the common law trust. Initially created as a vehicle for
avoiding some of the feudal incidents of ownership,3 the trust divides
its interests into the legal title held by the trustee on behalf of the
beneficiary, or cestui que trust, and the equitable title held by the
latter.'
This duality of ownership appears to be in direct conflict with
the civilian concept of autonomous and indivisible ownership which
first appeared in Justinian's Code and, after a period of dormancy,
was revived in Article 544 of the Code Napoleon,5 which defined owner-
ship as "the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most unlimited
* Member Louisiana State Bar; Associate Professor, Loyola University School
of Law, New Orleans. The research assistance of Linda Rose Gallagher, made available
by the support of an Alfred J. Bonomo, Sr., Family Scholarship, is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. Wisdom, Civil vs. Common Law Trusts, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1194, 1196 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Wisdom].
2. See Merryman, Ownership and Estate, 48 TUL. L. REv. 916, 941 (1974).
3. H. HANBURY & R. MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY 8 (10th ed. 1976).
4. Wright, Trusts and the Civil Law-A Comparative Study, 6 WEST ONT. L. REV.
114, 115 (1967) Ihereinafter cited as Wright].
5. Comment, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 AM. J. CoMP. L. 204, 210 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Why No Trusts].
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manner provided one does not use the same in a way prohibited by
the laws or ordinances."6 This endeavor to discard remnants of feudal
burdens which restricted ownership was characteristic of post-Revo-
lutionary France and surfaced in the Louisiana Digest of 1808, which
defined absolute ownership in corresponding terms.' That article was
essentially retained in the subsequent Louisiana Codes of 18259 and
1870.10
Yet, despite the enunciation of autonomous ownership as a primary
precept of the civil law, history reveals that split ownership was not
foreign to the Roman classical period. One writer observes that double
ownership existed in Rome in the dos, or wife's separate property,
with interests quite similar to the legal and equitable interests in
trusts." Additionally, the institution of the peculium castrense allowed
a son powers of administration over his separate property, subject
to the rights of inheritance in the paterfamilis.2 Thus, it is suggested
that the dichotomous nature of ownership is not an utterly alien con-
cept to the civil law tradition.
Another proposed obstacle to the adoption of the trust concept
is the doctrine of apparent ownership or publicity, which is basically
designed to alleviate hidden rights in property 3 by requiring public
registration of transactions creating rights in rem in order for them
'to be enforceable." Yet, only those transactions specifically enumerated
in a code's list of rights or its numerus clausus would be eligible for
such registration.5 It is contended by those who view this as an
obstacle to the introduction of trusts that the registry of the trustee
as owner in the official record would deprive the beneficiary of an
enforceable right should the trustee breach his duty. Yet, proponents
of the trust suggest that the official register could merely be expanded
to protect the interests of beneficiaries."
To many civilians the Anglo-American trust is considered func-
tionally unnecessary in light of the many existing civilian mechanisms
6. CODE NAPOLEON art. 544 (1804).
7. Why No Trusts, supra n. 5, at 210.
8. LA. DIGEST of 1808, art. 1, at 102.
9. LA. CIv. CODE art. 483 (1825).
10. LA. CIv. CODE art. 491 (1870).
11. Why No Trusts, supra n. 5, at 206.
12. Id.
13. Newman, Trusts, Civil Law Concepts and Legal Realism, 3 INTER-Am. L. REV.
379, 387-88 (1961).
14. Mayda, "Trusts" and "Living Law" in Europe, f03 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1042
(1955).
15. Wright, supra n. 4, at 116; Why No Trusts, supra n. 5, at 212.
16. Why No Trusts, supra n. 5, at 214.
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which may be used to accomplish the same ultimate results. 17 Pierre
LePaulle in his article "Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts" suggests
that the real substitute for the trust is the Romanistic concept of
fiduciae,'8 composed of two elements-(1) the real portion, consisting
of the conveyence of dominium of the res to the fiduciary and (2) the
personal or contractual portion, consisting of the agreement by which
the fiduciary assumes duties toward the beneficiary, or fideicomitente,
to use the property for the latter's benefit under specified conditions
imposed and then to return the property when the purpose is fulfilled,
either to the original transferor or to a third party nominated by him.'
Although this concept appears quite similar to the common law trust,
the beneficiary in the fiducia has no enforceable action at strict law,
but only an action in personam,0 the enforcement of which is left to
the equitable discretion of the judge." Thus, the property is not
segregated from that of the fiduciary and, should the latter declare
bankruptcy, the settlor would be treated as a general creditor.'
Frequently, the trust is compared to the German concept of
Treuhand, a fiduciary relationship which offers more protection for
the settlor than does the fiduciae. Under this arrangement, the set-
tlor transfers property to the fiduciary, or Treuhander, subject to a
resolutory condition.2 If the Treuhander breaches his duty, the prop-
erty will be reconveyed to the settlor. Additionally, the property re-
mains separate from that of the Treuhander, thus protecting it from
the fiduciary's creditors.' Even the Treuhand, however, does not pro-
vide the same benefits as the trust, since protection from the creditors
of the Treuhander only applies where the settlor is the beneficiary.
Otherwise, the beneficiary has only a personal right. Also, the pro-
tection against creditors generally extends only to the specific property
conveyed and not to any substituted forms it may take."5 Finally, if
the Treuhander breaches his duty, the entire trust fails," thus
defeating its original purpose.
The Roman fidei commissium also performed a function similar
17. K. W. RYAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CIVIL LAw 219-20 (1962) [hcreinafter cited
as RYAN]; LePaulle, Civil Law Substiit odes fur TDust.s, 35 YALE L. J. 1126 (1927) [hereinafter
cited as LePaullel.
18. LePaulle, supra n. 17, at 1138.
19. RYAN, supr., n. 17, at 224; Garrigues, Laow of Trusts, 2 AM. J. CoM. L. 25 (1953)
(hereinafter cited as Garrigues]; Wright, supra'r n. 4, at 118.
20. RYAN, supra n. 17, at 225.
21. Garrigues, su'pra n. 19, at 26-27.
22. Wright, supra n. 4, at 119.
23. RYAN, supra n. 17, at 226.
24. Wright, supra, n. 4, at 119.
25. d. at 120.
26. RYAN, sroprer n. 17, at 229.
1982] 1723
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
to the trust. Under this concept, property is given to a fiduciary who
is to later turn the property over to another, the fidei commissarius.
Although this resembles the trust in that the property may be real
or personal and the second person need not be alive at the creation
of the fidei commissum,1 it differs significantly from a trust in that
the first grantee or beneficiary manages the property for his own
interests and under no specific instructions from the transferor. 8 The
interests of the grantees are thus successive, rather than concurrent,
as in a trust." Finally, the fidei commissum may only be created by
testament 3° and even then, only under certain conditions varying from
country to country'.3
In addition to these concepts that are frequently compared to the
trust, other civilian concepts may fulfill some of the same objectives
as a trust. LePaulle points out that many of these serve the function
of providing management for an incapable person's property.2 The
concepts of tutorship and curatorship perform such a function.3 Yet,
neither of these is quite as flexible as the trust, since each involves
the management of all the property belonging to the incapable person,
rather than just particular portions, and since the tutor and curator
have less autonomy of operation due to the necessary court super-
vision. 4 Other examples, suggested by LePaulle, of civilian concepts
offering third-party management include a donation or legacy with
a charge, a contract for the benefit of third persons, and a deposit
or mandate coupled with a contract for the benefit of a third person."
If the objective is to provide a donee with temporary enjoyment of
property, while retaining an interest for oneself or one's heirs,
LePaulle notes that the granting of some combination of the three
elements of usus, abusus, and fructus is available in the civil law"
without resort to foreign concepts of income and principal beneficiaries.
VARIOUS CIVILIAN APPROACHES
Yet, despite all the possible substitutes for the trust, none seems
to provide all the benefits of the trust which was deemed by Maitland
27. LePaulle, supra n. 17, at 1143.
28. Id.
29. Wright, supra n. 4, at 118.
30. LePaulle, supra n. 17, at 1143; Vilella, The Problems of Trust Legislation in
Civil Law Jurisdictions: The Law of Trusts in Puerto Rico, 19 TuL. L. REV. 374, 383
(1945) [hereinafter cited as Vilellal; Wright, supra n. 4, at 118.
31. LePaulle, supra n. 17, at 1143.
32. Id. at 1134-35.
33. See Pascal, The Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LA. L. REV. 273, 274 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Pascal].
34. LePaulle, supra n. 17, at 1134-35.
35. Id. at 1136-39.
36. Id. at 1140-41.
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as "the most distinctive achievement of English lawyers."37 Thus, coun-
tries of the civilian tradition began to adopt the trust concept in their
own individual ways.
One approach was to enact a trust statute using familiar civilian
terms. Such was the method employed by Ricardo J. Alfaro, "the
father of the Latin-American legislation on trust."38 His book El Fidei
Comiso9 became the basis for the Panamanian trust, which is defined
as "an irrevocable mandate by virtue of which property is conveyed
to a person, the trustee (fiduciario), to be disposed of as ordered by
the one who conveys it, the creator of a trust (fideicomitente), for the
benefit of a third party, the beneficiary (fideicomisario)."0 The prob-
lem with that approach is that although civilians are familiar with
the concept of mandate, the idea of an irrevocable mandate is itself
foreign to them."'
Another approach was that proposed by the Institutionalists, most
notably represented by Pierre LePaulle of France and Marcel
Faribault of Quebec.2 Under this theory, the trust itself is an institu-
tion recognized by law and given the right to hold property. It is
in essence viewed as a juristic person, or as LePaulle phrased it, a
patrimonie affecte." The trustee is a mere administrator and any claim
of the beneficiary lie against the property itself."
Louisiana has taken a third approach. It decided to adopt "the
traditional Anglo-American trust concept ... but to define with preci-
sion the uses of the word 'trust' within a civil law framework so far
as practicable and desirable." 5 Yet, this adoption was not easy or swift,
nor was it unanimously welcomed."
37. F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 23 (1936).
38. Goldschmidt, The Trust in the Countries qf Latin America, 3 INTER-AM. L. REV.
29, 31 (1961).
39. R. ALFARO, Ei. FII)EI COMISO (1920).
40. Law 17 of 1941 of Panama, art. 1. The same definition appeared in Article
834 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico and is retained in the laws of Puerto Rico under
Section 2541 of Title 31, as enacted in 1952.
41. Vilella, supra n. 30, at 384.
42. See Mettarlin, The Quebec Trust and the Civil Law, 21 MCGILL L. J. 175, 211
(1975) (wherein the author refers to P. LEPAULLE, TRAITE THtORETIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DES TRUSTS (1932) [hereinafter cited as LEPAULLEI and M. FARIBAULT, LA FIDUCIE DANS
LA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC (1936)).
43. LEPAULLE, $upra n. 42, at 31.
44. Id. at 26-27. See also Wisdom, supra n. 1, at 1195 (wherein the author points
out that Mexico abandoned Alfaro's mandate in favor of LePaulle's institucidnfiduciaria
in 1932 and 1941).
45. L. OPPENHEIM, TRUSTS S 11 in 11 LOUISIANA Civil. LAW TREATISE (1977)
[hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM].
46. Professor Joseph Dainow points out that "one of the strongest positions of
antagonism to the common law trust was taken by the American State of Louisiana."
Dainow, The Introduction of the Trust in Louisiana, 39 CANADIAN B. REV. 396,397 (1961).
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SUBSTITUTIONS AND FIDEI COMMISSA
One of the major stumbling blocks to the acceptance of the trust
in Louisiana was Louisiana's prohibition of substitutions and fidei com-
missa which appeared in the Digest of 1808'" and was also included
in the Civil Codes of 1825" and 1870."9 Whether or not this prohibi-
tion was meant to include the trust is a question which has not been
consistently answered by the courts or the commentators.
In the Roman law, the term substitution included the vulgar and
the pupillary substitutions.5" The vulgar substitution provided for a
substitute to receive a legacy if the named legatee was incapable or
failed to accept.' This type of substitution was particularly sanctioned
in Louisiana by Article 1521 of the Civil Code of 1870.52 The pupillary
substitution was a means by which a father named an heir to
substitute for his minor child in the event the child died after the
father but before attaining testamentary capacity.' Another substitu-
tion, the exemplary, was an outgrowth of the pupillary and allowed
for a parent to name a substitute for an insane child that died without
ever regaining his sanity.' The pupillary and exemplary substitutions
were effective in Louisiana during the Spanish regime u and may have
been effective during the French colonial period as well.'
The fidei commissa, first appeared at the end of the Roman
Republic. 7 During the Republic, however, the charge, imposed by the
donor on the original donee, to transfer the property at a stated time
to a third person designated by the donor was not enforceable but
its execution rested on the good faith of the first donee, or heres."
47. LA. DIGEST of 1808, art. 40, at 216.
48. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1507 (1825).
49. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1520 (1870).
50. 2 J. DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER SS 3764-65 (L. Cushing ed.,
W. Strahan trans. 1850) Ihereinafter cited as DOMAT]; Pascal, supra n. 33, at 277; Tucker,
Substitutions, Fideicommissa and Trusts in Louisiana Law. A Semantical Reappraisal,
24 LA. L. REV. 439, 443-44 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Tucker].
51. DoMAT, supra n. 50, at S 3771; LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. VI, tit. V, L. IV (S. Scott
trans. 1931).
52. See also LA. Civ. CODE art. 1508 (1825); LA. DIGEST of 1808, art. 41, at 218; CODE
NAPOLEON art. 898 (1804).
53. DoMAT, supra n. 50, at S 3787; LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. VI, tit. V, Ls. V-X (S. Scott
trans. 1931).
54. DOMAT, supra n. 50, at S 3797; LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. VI, tit. V, L. XI (S. Scott
trans. 1931).
55. Colonel Tucker notes that Las Siete Partidas includes these under the substitu-
tions in Title V of Book VI. Tucker, supra n. 50, at 444.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 444-45.
58. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BooK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 353
(1932).
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During the reign of Augustus, the duty to deliver the property to
the second donee was enforced by the administrative authority of the
counsuls. Eventually a special praetor, the praetorfidei commissarius,
was appointed to regulate the relations between the heres and the
fidei commissarius."9 Under Vespasian, it was provided that the first
donee could retain one-quarter of the whole, the remainder of which
he was required to deliver to the third person.' During the reign
of Justinian, the part retained by the first donee became known as
the Trebellianic portion.'
In the twelfth century, the fidei commissum was introduced in
France with the revival of the Roman law and was freely used until
the mid-sixteenth century in order to keep land within the family. 2
Restrictions were later imposed, culminating in the abolition of fidei
commissa in Article 896 of the Code Napoleon. 3 Las Siete Partidas,
which derived much from Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis, included
a section on the fidei commissaria and specifically provided for the
Trebellianic portion."
An analysis of Article 40 of the Louisiana Digest of 18085
demonstrates that the first two paragraphs of that article basically
correspond to Article 896 of the Code Napoleon, except that Article
40 prohibits substitutions and fidei commissa whereas Article 896
speaks only of substitutions. The last paragraph of Article 40, deal-
ing with the Trebellianic portion, corresponds to Law 14, Title V of
the Sixth Partidas." Thus, it has been suggested that the prohibition
contained in Article 40 of the Digest, which also appears in Article
1520 of the Louisiana Civil Code of. 1870, was a prohibition against
the Roman fidei commissum.17
The major difficulty in the interpretation of the Louisiana pro-
hibition is that the prohibition appearing in the Digest of 1808 and
in the Codes of 1825 and 1870 is of substitutions andfidei commissa.
One explanation is that the redactors used both terms out of an "abun-
dance of caution," but really meant to prohibit the concept known
in France as a substitution, which was prohibited there in 1792 and
was the very same concept referred to as a "fidei commissaria' that
59. Id.
60, Tucker, supra n. 50, at 444.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. V1, tit. V. L. XIV (S. Scott trans. 1931). See also SPANISH
CIr. CODE art. 781 (1889).
65. LA. DIGEST of 1808, art. 40, at 216.
66. Tucker. supra n. 50, at 463.
67. Id. at 461-62.
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was permitted in Spain at the time of the drafting of the Louisiana
Civil Code."
This theory, however, is not reflected in the Louisiana cases, which
appear to find a distinction between substitutions and fidei commissa.
One theory distinguishes the two concepts based on the first donee's
charge to preserve the property and then to transmit it to the third
person. The duty to preserve is deemed the characterizing element
of the prohibited substitution, rendering the entire disposition null.
The fidei commissum, however, merely directs the first donee to later
convey the property to the third person with no duty to preserve
the property. Thus, the disposition to the first donee is upheld, but
the charge to convey is deemed as not having been written."
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRUST
Another view, which perhaps did the most to discourage adop-
tion of the trust in Louisiana, is that the prohibition against fidet com-
missa was nothing more than a prohibition of the Anglo-American
trust.0 There is some indication that fidei commissa and substitutions
were permitted in Louisiana to some extent prior to the Digest of
1808.1 However, with the prohibition of substitutions appearing in
the Digest of 1808 and its reiteration in the later Codes, coupled with
the opinion that trusts were a form of substitution, courts refused
to recognize trusts in. Louisiana without an enabling act. The first
such act came, perhaps more than coincidentally, in 1882 when Paul
Tulane wished to make a sizable donation for the establishment of
an educational institution." In that year the legislature exempted from
the laws against substitutions and fidei commissa all donations for
educational, charitable, or literary purposes." In 1902 the legislature
authorized banks to act as trustees,"' and in 1914 trustees were author-
ized to accept mortgages in their capacity as trust representatives. 5
Finally, in 1920, private trusts of a limited duration were
permitted. Yet, the duties of the trustee, settlor, and beneficiary were
not well defined. The 1920 legislation was repealed in 1935 and was
68. Id. at 465-66.
69. Succession of Reilly, 136 La. 347, 67 So. 27 (1914).
70. See Nabors, Restrictions Upon the Ownership of Property in Louisiana-Trusts,
Fidei Commissa and Substitutions, 4 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1929) (wherein the author cites
E. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 305 (A. Bonomo ed. 1925)).
71. Ducloslange v. Ross, 3 La. Ann. 432, 432 (1848).
72. Stone, Trusts in Louisiana, 1 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 368, 370 (1952).
73. 1882 La. Acts, No. 124.
74. 1902 La. Acts, No. 45.
7. 1914 La. Acts, No. 72.
76. 1920 La. Acts, No. 107.
77. 1935 La. Acts, 3d Ex. Sess., No. 7.
1728 [Vol. 42
LOUISIANA TRUSTS
followed in 1938 by the Trust Estates Act,"8 the first complete code
of trust law adopted by a North American state." Its sources included
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Trusts, the
Uniform Trusts Act, the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the
Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act, Dean Griswold's Model Spendthrift
Trust Act, and common trust fund provisions from a tentative draft
of the Uniform Trusts Act."
The Trust Estates Act, however, was not satisfactory as it was
not well integrated with the Louisiana Civil Code, leaving problems
concerning such concepts as forced heirship and the rule against
substitutions and fidei commissa.8" In 1952, the Louisiana Trust Estates
Act was amended, extending the possible duration of the trust from
the previous limit of ten years from the settlor's death or ten years
from the beneficiary's majority, to a limit of ten years from the set-
tlor's death or until the beneficiary's death, whichever was longer.2
In 1959, Professor Leonard Oppenheim was appointed by the Loui-
siana Law Institute as Reporter to study the Trust Estates Act and
to propose possible revision.88 The study culminated in the Louisiana
Trust Code of 1964. Prior to the adoption of that Code, remedial
legislation was proposed in 1962, partially because of the substitution
questions which arose in the cases of Succession of Guillory4 in 1957
and Succession of Meadors85 in 1961. Succession of Guillory arose as
a result of the death of a Texas domiciliary possessed of Louisiana
real estate which he bequeathed to a Texas bank to hold in trust
"during the lifetime of Terrell Guillory." At the time of Terrell's death,
the naked ownership and possession of the property was to go "to
the Baptist General Convention of the State of Louisiana" and was
to be retained by it, so that revenues could be used for the benefit
of the Louisiana Baptist denomination." Without explaining the reason-
ing for its decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court deemed the bequest
a clear prohibited substitution.
Deeming Guillory "decisive," the Second Circuit found a prohibited
substitution in the Meadors case. This case also involved the death
of an out-of-state domiciliary who owned real property in Louisiana.
The will of the decedent contained a bequest that the residue of his
78. 1938 La. Acts, No. 81.
79. Patton, Trust System in the Western Hemisphere, 19 TUL. L. REV. 398, 412 (1945).
80. Wisdom, supra n. 1, at 1196.
81. OPPENHEIM, supra n. 45, at S 1, at 2.
82. LA. R.S. 9:1794 (1950), as amended by 1952 La. Acts, No. 209, S 1 (repealed 1964).
83. OPPENHEIM, supra n. 45, at S 1, at 3.
84. 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957).
85. 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
86. 232 La. at 215, 94 So. 2d at 38-39.
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property, after making certain particular legacies, was to go to a Ten-
nessee bank in trust, with instructions to pay the decedent's sister
$100 per month for her life and to pay the remaining income to dece-
dent's wife for life. On the death of either the wife or sister, all in-
come was to be paid to the survivor until her death, at which time
the trust was to terminate with the property to be distributed to
decedent's heirs according to the intestate succession laws of Ten-
nessee. By finding that title to the decedent's property did not vest
in the legal heirs until the trust terminated, the court found that a
double disposition prohibited by Article 1520 of the Civil Code and
Article 4, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 had been
created. Appellee asserted that, because the wife and sister merely
held a beneficial interest in income, the heirs held a beneficial interest
in principal which vested at the time of the creation of the trust. This
theory was rejected by the court, creating much anxiety among attor-
neys as to whether any trust containing separate income and prin-
cipal beneficiaries would be upheld in Louisiana."
One of the remedial actions taken in 1962 was the enactment of
Act No. 521 which amended Article 4, Section 16 of the Louisiana
Constitution and provided in part: "Substitutions, not in trust are and
remain prohibited, but trusts may contain substitutions to the extent
authorized by the Legislature." Similarly, Act 45 of 1962 amended
Civil Code Article 1520, indicating that substitutions in trust were
permitted, and deleted any prohibition of fidei commissa. Both provi-
sions were designed to encourage trust legislation and pave the way
for the new Trust Code.88 In 1962, other changes in the Trust Estates
Act were made, including clarifying the duration of the trust," con-
firming the propriety of mixed private and charitable trusts,"0 and
affirming the possibility of separate beneficiaries of income and prin-
cipal.8 Finally in 1964 the present Louisiana Trust Code was adopted. 2
.The Code itself set up the mode for its interpretation. Its provi-
sions were to be liberally construed in favor of freedom of disposi-
tion, with resort being had to the Civil Code only when the Trust
Code was silent on an issue."'
87. See also Succession of Simms, 250 La. 177, 195 So. 2d 114 (1966), cert. denied
sub nom. Kitchen v. Reese, 389 U.S. 850 (1967) (which was decided on the basis of
the law in effect prior to the 1964 Trust Code).
88. OPPENHEIM, supra n. 45, at S 10, at 19.
89. 1962 La. Acts, No. 74, amending LA. R.S. 9:1794 (1950) (repealed 1964).
90. 1962 La. Acts, No. 44, adding LA. R.S. 9:1844 (repealed 1964).
91. 1962 La. Acts, No. 44, amending LA. R.S. 9:1903 (1950) (repealed 1964); 1962
La. Acts, No. 74, S 2, amending LA. R.S: 9:1921 (1950 (repealed 1964).
92. 1964 La. Acts, No. 338.
93. LA. R.S. 9:1724 (Supp. 1965).
1730 [Vol. 42
LOUISIANA TRUSTS
THE NEW CODE AND SUBSTITUTIONS
The adoption of the Trust Code did not automatically usher in
total acceptance of the trust concept. Even after its adoption, trusts
were closely scrutinized and some were invalidated on the grounds
that they contained prohibited substitutions, as in the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in Crichton v. Succession of Gredler.' Mrs.
Gredler's will created trusts in favor of her two nephews, as benefici-
aries, and stated that if either nephew died before the termination
of the trusts, the income and principal should be paid to his children.
If the deceased nephew was not survived by children, that interest
would go to the surviving beneficiary, or if the other beneficiary were
also deceased, to his children. If neither the nephews nor their children
were living at the termination of each trust, the income and principal
were to be paid to the children of a predeceased brother of the dece-
dent. The Court deemed the trusts null as containing prohibited sub-
stitutions, reasoning that the substitutions took effect after the trusts.
terminated. As they were thus not "in trust," even the Trust Code
could not save them. If the Court had interpreted the trusts liberally,
it could have viewed the provisions as merely unnecessary contingent
alternate provisions due to the nephews' having survived the dece-
dent, or it could have merely invalidated the illegal portions while
upholding the remaining provisions of the trusts." Instead, many of
the pre-1964 attitudes toward trusts seemed to premeate the major-
ity's opinion.
A more liberal view toward substitutions arose in the 1970s. One
striking example is the First Circuit case of Succession of Materiste,"
in which the decedent established a testamentary trust naming as
income beneficiaries her mother as to one-half and her brothers and
sisters as to the other half. The testatrix provided that on her mother's
death certain nieces and nephews were to succeed to the mother's
half interest. Should any of the nieces and nephews die, his or her
share was to be divided among the survivors. On the death of the
last sibling of the testatrix, the trust was to terminate, with 45%
of the corpus to be divided by roots among the siblings' descendants,
or should any sibling die without descendants, his or her portion would
be divided by roots among the brothers and sisters leaving descen-
dants. Another 45% was to go to certain nieces and nephews who
had been named as alternate income beneficiaries at the time of the
testatrix's mother's death, and 10% was to go to a particular church.
The court viewed those who were to take at the termination of the
94. 256 La. 156, 235 So. 2d 411 (La. 1970).
95. OPPENHEIM, supra n. 45, at S 25, at 68.
96. 273 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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trust, not as substitutes, but as principal beneficiaries. The creation
of successive income beneficiaries was sanctioned, and the provision
for a substitute as to the 450/0 of the principal for the descendants
of the brothers and sisters of the decedent was viewed as an allowable
vulgar substitution.
Similarly in Succession of Stewart,7 the Louisiana Supreme Court,
in interpreting a trust which went into effect prior to the Trust Code
of 1964, upheld the trust against a challenge that it contained a pro-
hibited substitution, stating that "the bequest to the trustees was not
made to them as owners or as beneficiaries but rather 'in trust' sub-
ject to the terms and conditions as therein set forth." 8
Again, in Succession of Burgess," the Fourth Circuit upheld a trust
in which the settlor provided that, should a grandchild beneficiary
die, intestate and without descendants, during the trust, his interest
would, vest in the settlor's surviving grandchild or grandchildren or
their descendants "per stirpes." Although the court held that the trust
did not meet the requirements of a class trust which would have per-
mitted such a substitution,' it still upheld the trust since the grand-
sons were free to leave the property to others by testament and were
not controlled by the will of the original testatrix.
Currently, the Trust Code itself sanctions provisions which would
previously have been viewed as substitutions. One example from the
1964 Trust Code is the possibility within class trusts of a shifting
in principal to other members of a class when a child or grandchild
beneficiary under a class trust dies intestate and without descendants
during the terms of the trust, as long as the interests of descendant
forced heirs are not prejudiced. 10 Additionally, Section 1 of Act 160
of 1974 contained a general provision governing the shifting of in-
terests in principal and allowing the settlor to name substitute prin-
cipal beneficiaries to take in the event that the original beneficiary
died intestate and without descendants during the term of the trust
or at the time of its termination. 12 The settlor's right in the latter
instance is subject to the requirement that the substitute be in being
and ascertainable at the creation of the trust.03 Not only is this shift-
ing a form of substitution but, when Louisiana provided for ascen-
97. 301 So. 2d 872 (La. 1974).
98. Id. at 883.
99. 359 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). writ denied. 360 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1978).
100. LA. R.S. 9:1891 (Supp. 1965).
101. LA. R.S. 9:1892 (Supp. 1965).
102. LA, R.S. 9:1972 et seq. (Supp. 1981).
103. LA. R.S. 9:1975 (Supp. 1981).
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dant forced heirship, it also allowed for the possibility of depriving
an ascendant forced heir of his legitime. 4
TITLE AND THE TRUSTEE
One of the first questions addressed by the Reporter and Advisory
Committee preparing the Trust Code of 1964 was whether the trustee
was to have title of the trust property. The decision to retain the
Anglo-American concept of trust, with the trustee as legal title holder
was unanimously adopted by the Reporter and the Committee and
subsequently sanctioned by the Council of the Louisiana Law
Institute.' Accordingly, Article 1781 of the Trust Code states that
"a trustee is a person to whom title to the trust property is transfer-
red to be administered by him as a fiduciary."
Prior to the Trust Estates Act, vesting of legal title in the trustee
was viewed by the courts as a common law concept prohibited by
Louisiana law.' Later cases, however, repeatedly recognized the
trustee as the legal title holder for the benefit of himself or another.'7
With that recognition came the right of the trustee, to whom succes-
sion property had been left in trust, to be placed in possession without
an administration' and the right of a trustee-executor to be recognized
as the particular legatee of property left in trust by the settlor, thus
alleviating any need for the trustee to make a demand on himself
as executor in order to claim the interest on any stocks held in trust.,'
Even where a beneficiary of a usufruct in trust had the naked owner-
ship of part of the burdened property, no confusion of interests was
found to exist, since the trustee was deemed to be the holder of "title"
of the usufruct."0
Yet, is the trustee as title holder also the owner of the property?
If so, is that ownership absolute and indivisible as required by civilian
tradition? These questions were posed in the case of Reynolds v.
Reynolds."' Mrs. Reynolds had been designated as one of four
104. See LA. CIr. CODE art. 1494, prior to its repeal by 1981 La. Acts, No. 442.
105. OPPENHEIM, supra n. 45, at S 11, at 20.
106. Buck v. Larcade. 183 La. 570, 578, 164 So. 593, 595 (1936).
107. Succession of Carriere, 216 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), writ denied,
253 La. 639, 219 So. 2d 175 (1969); Succession of Hines, 341 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1976).
108. Succession of Carriere, 216 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), writ denied,
253 La. 639, 219 So. 2d 175 (1969).
109. Succession of Hines, 341 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
110. Succession of Harper, 147 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962), application not
considered, 243 La. 1012, 149 So. 2d 766 (1963).
111. 388 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1980).
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beneficiaries of a testamentary trust created on the death of her grand-
mother, which occurred prior to Mrs. Reynolds's marriage. During
the Reynoldses' marriage, part of the trust income had been
distributed to the wife and kept in a bank account under her exclusive
control, while another portion remained undistributed and was retained
by the trustee pursuant to the discretionary powers outlined in the
trust. Because Mrs. Reynolds had not recorded a declaration of
paraphernality indicating that she would administer her separate
property,"' any income from her separate property would be deemed
community property.
Upon divorce, Mr. Reynolds therefore sought to characterize all
the trust income accruing during the marriage as community property.
This assertion was supported by a case decided by the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1949, United States v. Burglass,"3
which was decided under the Louisiana Trust Estates Act of 1938.
In Burglass, the Fifth Circuit found the beneficiary's interest in trust
income to be community property and recognized the trustee as legal
title holder and the beneficiaries as "owners in indivision" of the
property."' In contrast, Mrs. Reynolds claimed that the trust income
was all separate property, relying on the case of Dunham v. Dunham,"'
which held as separate property the income from a trust of which
one of the spouses was a beneficiary. The income had accrued during
the marriage of the parties. Under the terms of the Dunham trust,
none of the trust income was actually distributed to the beneficiary
spouse during the term of the trust. Yet, the court used the oppor-
tunity to repudiate the Burglass conclusion that ownership of the cor-
pus rested in the beneficiary and title vested in the trustee. The
Dunham court stated that "the intent of our trust laws as expressed
in the language employed therein by the legislature is to clearly and
unmistakably vest both title and ownership of the trust corpus in the
trustee.""'
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court on original hearing held that all
the income, both distributed and undistributed, was the separate prop-
erty of the beneficiary spouse. Approving of Dunham, the Court
equated the trustee's title with ownership. However, on rehearing,
a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the distributed income
was community property and that the undistributed income remained
the separate property of the beneficiary spouse. The Court, citing Loui-
112. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2386 (1870).
113. 172 F. 2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949).
114. Id. at 963.
115. 174 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
116. Id. at 907.
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siana Civil Code Article 477 and former Article 489, stated that the
beneficiary's interest was clearly less than full ownership"' and that
title to the property vested in the trustee."' The Court characterized
the beneficial interest as an incorporeal right and the distributed
revenues from that incorporeal right were deemed civil fruits."9
Chief Justice Dixon dissented to the characterization of the
distributed income as community property, pointing to the distinc-
tion between a beneficiary's right to receive the corpus itself and a
beneficiary's right to receive the income produced by that corpus.
Justice Dixon viewed Mrs. Reynolds's income interest, which was sub-
ject to spendthrift provisions, as an annuity or alimentary pension,
rather than a usufruct, or right to fruits. 20 Additionally, since Mrs.
Reynolds's interest in the corpus was less than full "ownership" of
separate property, the income from it could not be deemed fruits from
separate property and therefore was not subject to community prop-
erty designation. Thus, "the trust agreement conferred upon her, as
a donation mortis causa, an independent interest in receiving those
funds," and therefore the funds were her separate property."2 ' Reynolds
thus illustrates some of the fundamental problems that exist in deter-
mining the ownership interests in trust. The Supreme Court itself
rendered only a plurality decision, leaving the characterization of in-
terests rather tenuously defined."'
THE LEGITIME IN TRUST
Since a settlor may wish to establish a trust naming his children
as beneficiaries, and since the latter are descendant forced heirs, some
accommodation of these two concepts was necessary in Louisiana. The
Louisiana Trust Estates Act of 1938 specifically permitted the plac-
ing of the legitime in trust.' 3 In Succession of Earhart,' the Loui-
siana Supreme Court upheld the placing of the legitime in trust over
the appellant's challenge that this conflicted with Article 4, Section
117. Reynolds, 388 So. 2d at 1141.
118. Id. at 1142.
119. Id. The holding in this case appears somewhat incongruous with the earlier
case of St. Charles Land Trust v. St. Amant, 253 La. 243, 217 So. 2d 385 (1968), in
which a beneficiary's interest in a trust corpus comprised of a mineral interest was
characterized as an immovable for inheritance tax purposes.
120. Reynolds, 388 So. 2d at 1146.
121. Id. at 1148.
122. See Le Van, Forum Juridicum-Louisiana Counterparts to Legal and Equitable
Title, 41 LA. L REv. 1177, 1185 (1981) (wherein the author notes the "air of instablility"
of Reynolds).
123. LA. R.S. 9:1793 (1950) (repealed 1964).
124. 220 La. 817. 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
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16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, which prohibited the aboli-
tion of forced heirship. The Court noted that, although the legislature
could not abolish forced heirship, it could regulate it.'25
Article 1841 of the Louisiana Trust Code of 1964 specifies that
the legitime may be placed in trust, provided: (1) the income accruing
to the forced heir be paid to him at least once a year, (2) there be
no charges or conditions on the forced heir's interest other than those
dealing with spendthrift provisions, with a legally sanctioned usufruct
burdening the legitime, and with conditions imposed in the class
trust,"0 (3) the term of the trust as it affects the legitime not exceed
the life of the forced heir, except where the legitime is burdened with
a legal usufruct held by the settlor's surviving spouse, and (4) the
principal be delivered to the forced heir, his heirs, legatees or
assignees at the termination of the part of the trust affecting the
legitime. Article 12, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
also expressly permits the legitime to be placed in trust, and subse-
quent cases have sanctioned the placing of the entire legitime 2 7 or
any heir's individual forced portion'" in trust.
Article 1844 of the Trust Code, as amended in 1974,19 allows a
legitime in trust to be burdened with an income interest or usufruct
in favor of the settlor's surviving spouse to the same extent as such
is possible out of trust. With the legislative changes made in 1981,
however, there is some question as to how extensive the burden on
a legitime may be. Act 911 of 1981 amends Louisiana Civil Code Arti-
cle 916, dealing with the usufruct of the surviving spouse. Additionally,
Act 919 of the same legislative session provides that a new Article
890 replace previous Article 916. Both the provisions in Act 911 and
in Act 919 provide that if a person dies intestate, the surviving spouse
shall have a legal usufruct over the decedent's share of community
property inherited by his or her descendants, that the usufruct will
end on the surviving spouse's remarriage unless confirmed by testa-
125. See also Succession of Singlust, 169 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writ
refused, 247 La. 262, 170 So. 2d 512 (1965).
126. The amendment of Section 1841 of the 1964 Trust Code (La. R.S. 9:1941) by
Act 160 in 1979 resulted in the possibility that an ascendant forced heir might be
deprived of his legitime if the person from whom he would inherit was a principal
beneficiary of a trust and had died intestate without descendants. In such a case, the
settlor of the trust could name a substitute principal beneficiary, completely bypass-
ing any ascendant forced heirs of the initial beneficiary. See 1981 La. Acts, No. 442
(abolishing ascendant forced heirship).
127. Succession of Tatum, 347 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ refused,.350
So. 2d 896 (La. 1977).
128. Succession of Mohana, 351 So. 2d 1287 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), writ denied,
354 So. 2d 200 (La. 1978).
129. 1974 La. Acts, No. 126, S 1.
1736 [Vol. 42
LOUISIANA TRUSTS
ment for life, or a shorter period, and that the usufruct will not be
an impingement on the legitime of the decendants. However, the two
acts differ as to whether the deceased may, by testament, grant to
the surviving spouse a usufruct for life or a shorter period over
separate property composing the legitime of any non-issue of the
marriage.' Act 911 allows a testator to bequeath to the surviving
spouse a usufruct over separate property composing the legitime of
any descendants and allows those who are nonissue of the marriage
the possibility of requesting security to protect their interests.'3'
However, the decedent's ability to grant to the surviving spouse a
non-impinging usufruct over separate property is limited by Act 919
to the situations in which the legitime in question belongs to the issue
of the marriage or to any illegitimate children, subject to the ability
of the illegitimate children to request security. Thus, according to Act
919, the granting of a usufruct to a surviving spouse over separate
property that composes the legitime inherited by legitimate children
of a previous marriage would be an impingement on that legitime.
This raises the question of the extent to which a usufruct may burden
the legitime held in trust for descendants. Presumably, a resolution
of the conflict between Act 911 and Act 919 by the courts would pro-
vide an answer for the legitime in trust as well. 32
However, the forced heir's interest may not be satisfied by an
income interest in trust,'33 anymore than a usufruct could satisfy that
130. The original version of Act 919 was introduced in the Louisiana House of
Representatives as Bill 817 and allowed the granting of a non-impinging usufruct over
separate property inherited by any descendants. A Senate amendment on July 31,
1981 resulted in the altered version which was passed that day limiting non-impingement
to separate property inherited by issue of the marriage or illegitimate children. In-
cluded in the Act was the statement: "In the event of any conflict between the provi-
sions of this Act and those of any other Act adopted by the legislature at its Regular
Session of 1981, regardless of which Act is adopted later or signed later by the gover-
nor, the provisions of this Act shall apply." Act 919 stated it was applicable as to
persons dying after December 31, 1982.
Later on July 31, the legislature passed Act 911 which permits the testator to grant
a non-impinging usufruct over separate property inherited by any descendants. This
Act, which became effective on September 11. 1981, contains the following language:
"All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed. To the extent
that the provisions of House Bill No. 817 by Mr. Fernandez, introduced at the 1981
Regular Session of the Legislature of Louisiana, are inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act, those provisions of House Bill No. 817 are hereby repealed."
131. Act 911 of 1981 provides for the enactment of Article 3154.1 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure which states that security may be requested by non-issue.
132. By allowing a testator to place a greater burden on the legitime of illegitimate
children, as opposed to legitimate non-issue of a marriage. Article 919 is subject to
constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds. Cf. Succession of Sidney Brown.
Jr., 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
133. Sachnowitz v. Nelson, 357 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), writ denied.
359 So. 2d 627 (La. 1978).
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interest out of trust.' An interesting question thus arises when a
settlor places the legitime in trust and when the corpus consists only
of non-income producing property. In Succession of Burgess'" the
Fourth Circuit held that, absent a situation where the legitime was
subject to a sanctioned legal usufruct of the surviving spouse, a
legitime could not be satisfied by an interest in a trust when insuffi-
cient income was generated. The income, to be adequate, would have
to correspond to the present value of the future income which the
forced heir could expect on the basis of his present life expectancy.
Without that necessary income, the trust would have to be reformed,
allowing for the sale of enough of the corpus and its conversion into
income-producing property sufficient to satisfy the legitime.'3'
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE LOUISIANA TRUST
In addition to the policy decisions concerning title, substitutions,
and legitime, other provisions of the Trust Code render it uniquely
a product of Louisiana. For example, rejecting any duration period
based on the common law Rule against Perpetuities,"7 the Commit-
tee adopted a time period for the trust based on the lifetime of an
income beneficiary.'39 By affirmative stipulation in the trust, the set-
tlor could provide for a duration of fifteen years, now amended to
twenty years,'39 from the death of the settlor when he is a natural
person or from the creation of the trust if the settlor is not.
Related to the question of duration was that of termination of
the trust. Following the American rule first established by the 1889
case of Claflin v. Claflin,"I the Committee adopted a policy of in-
destructibility of trusts even if all parties consented to terminating
the trust and even if a legitime were involved."'
134. See LA. R.S. 9:1845 (Supp. 1965); Succession of Williams, 184 So. 2d 70 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. State in Interest of Bolds, 250 La. 748, 199 So.
2d 183 (1967). After Williams, Section 1845 was deemed obsolete and was repealed
by 1979 La. Acts, No. 160.
135. 359 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 360 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1978).
136. Id. at 1020.
137. OPPENHEIM, supra n. 45, at S 11, at 21.
138. LA. R.S. 9:1831 (Supp. 1965) (amended 1968).
139. LA. R.S. 9:1831, as amended by 1968 La. Acts, No. 132, S 1. The possibility of a
trust surviving beyond the lives of the income beneficiaries has been criticized on
the grounds that such could result in the continuation of a trust only.for the benefit
of the trustee. Robertson, Some Interesting Features of the Proposed Trust Code, 24
LA. L. REv. 712, 713 (1964).
140. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
141. See McLendon v. First National Bank of Shreveport, 299 So. 2d 407, 410 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974) (which was decided under the terms of the Trust Estates Act, but.
which noted that "the concept of indestructibility has been carried over in the new
trust code").
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A few other policy determinations give the Louisiana trust a
civilian perspective. One is the requirement that all beneficiaries be
in being and definitely ascertainable at the time of the creation of
the trust, 2 thus rejecting the notion of common law contingent re-
mainders. The only exceptions are class trusts where only one member
of the class need be in being at the creation of the trust (and members
of the class are limited to children and grandchildren)," 3 trust for
employees,"' and trusts for mixed private and charitable purposes."'
Another concept that is foreign to civilian theory, and basically
rejected in Louisiana, is recognizing powers of appointment. However,
the Trust Code does allow for the invasion of principal by the trustee
for the benefit of the income beneficiary even when income and prin-
cipal beneficiaries are not identical."6 By requiring "objective stan-
dards" for such invasion, the drafters attempted to gain favorable
federal tax treatment"' and to maintain a consistency with the Loui-
siana Civil Code which prohibits powers of appointment. "8
CONCLUSION
Louisiana, with its civilian tradition, has adopted the Anglo-
American trust. As a corollary, however, it has experienced difficulties
in integrating some of the trust characteristics with the civilian
tradition.
Questions of title still exist, as illustrated in the Reynolds case.
Although the Louisiana courts have been more liberal recently in their
interpretation of trusts, drafters should still use caution in order to
avoid the possibility of including substitutions that are not sanctioned
by the Trust Code. Additionally, when placing the legitime in trust,
care must be taken to assure the production of adequate annual in-
come for payment to the forced heirs. Despite its limitations, the trust
does indeed function in Louisiana. If used with caution, it offers a
valuable tool for tax and estate planning to the Louisiana domiciliary.
142. LA. R.S. 9:1803 (Supp. 1965).
143. LA. R.S. 9:1891 (Supp. 1965).
144. LA. R.S. 9:1921 (Supp. 1965).
145. See LA. R.S. 1951 (Supp. 1981), a.s amemed b!y 1972 La. Acts, No. 659, % 1.
146. See LA. R.S. 9:2068 (Supp. 1981), ws ,imen'dd by 1968 La. Acts, No. 133, § 1:1972
La. Acts, No. 661. % 1; 1974 La. Acts, No. 158, % i.
147. Lemann, !,.'Iaision. af PrincipI in Luisia un, 42 Tim.. L. RF:v. 829, 834 (1968).
148. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1573 (1870).
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